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RESTRICTIONS ON POLITICAL ACTIVITY BY 
JUDGES IN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES: 
THE CASES OF JUDGE TERANISHI AND 
JUSTICE SANDERS 
DANIEL H. FOOTE∗ 
In the late 1990s, similar dramas relating to political activity by judges 
were playing out on opposite sides of the Pacific Ocean. The cases 
involved a Japanese decision concerning an assistant judge of the Sendai 
District Court, Teranishi Kazushi, and an American decision relating to a 
newly sworn-in justice of the Supreme Court of the State of Washington, 
Richard Sanders. Both attended gatherings with distinctly political 
agendas. Both made brief remarks implying, but never directly stating, 
their support for the agendas presented. Both were censured for having 
engaged in impermissible political activity. Both appealed those censures, 
ultimately as far as the Grand Bench of the Supreme Court of Japan and 
the Washington State Supreme Court, respectively. The decisions 
examined nearly the same set of factors and followed similar reasoning.  
The most salient difference between the two cases lies in their final 
outcomes. In a split, ten-to-five decision, the Japanese Supreme Court 
found that Teranishi had engaged in impermissible political activity and 
upheld the censure; however, the Washington State Supreme Court 
unanimously overturned Sanders’ censure, finding that his actions had not 
overstepped the applicable legal boundary. Perhaps even more striking 
than the difference in outcomes, however, is the difference in procedure 
between the two cases. In Washington State, all but the initial stage of the 
process was conducted in the open, subject to broad scrutiny by the public. 
In Japan, in contrast, most of the process was conducted behind closed 
doors, away from public scrutiny. This difference, I would submit, reflects 
a difference in the underlying philosophy of the two judicial systems. In 
the United States, public knowledge of who judges are, what they think, 
and how the judicial system operates is viewed as important for 
maintaining public trust in the judiciary. In Japan, however, the 
fundamental ethos of the judiciary is one of uniformity and anonymity. 
People’s trust in the impartiality and fairness of judges rests largely on the 
 
 
 ∗ This Essay is based on material that appeared in Japanese in DANIEL H. FOOTE (Tamaruya 
Masayuki trans.), NA MO NAI KAO MO NAI SHIHŌ: NIHON NO SAIBAN WA KAWARU NO KA [NAMELESS 
FACELESS JUSTICE: WILL JAPAN’S COURTS CHANGE?] (2007). This Essay is published with the 
permission of NTT Shuppan. Daniel H. Foote is a Professor of Law at The University of Tokyo. 
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view that the identity of the judge does not matter, that procedures and 
outcomes will be the same no matter who the judges are. In keeping with 
this ethos, which I have labeled elsewhere as Japan’s “nameless, faceless 
judiciary,”1 differences in judges’ personalities and views, and the 
workings of the judiciary, are submerged and hidden from public view.  
This Essay begins by setting out the basic facts of the two cases. After 
briefly examining the respective outcomes and legal reasoning, the Essay 
proceeds to a comparative examination of the procedures and the basic 
stance of the two systems. 
I. THE ACTIVITIES AT ISSUE 
A. Japan: The Teranishi Case 
The gathering at issue in In re Teranishi2 (“Teranishi case”) occurred 
in April 1998, but the genesis of the matter lay more than six months 
earlier. The underlying debate concerned the proposed Organized Crime 
Countermeasures Acts,3 and, in particular, provisions contained in one of 
the three proposed Acts allowing wiretaps under certain circumstances, if 
authorized in advance by a warrant issued by a judge.4 After the 
Legislative Council (Hōsei Shingikai, a deliberative council attached to the 
Ministry of Justice) sent an outline of the bill to the Minister of Justice, 
Teranishi, who at the time had served as an assistant judge for over five 
years, submitted a comment to the Asahi Shinbun newspaper (Japan’s 
second largest newspaper, with a daily circulation of over eight million).5  
 
 
 1. See FOOTE, supra note ∗. 
 2. This description of the facts is based primarily on the account contained in the Supreme 
Court decision, In re Teranishi, 52 MINSHŪ 1761 (Sup. Ct., Dec. 1, 1998), as supplemented by 
additional materials from a book written by Teranishi, TERANISHI KAZUSHI, YUKAI NA SAIBANKAN [A 
CHEERFUL JUDGE] (2000); newspaper accounts; and a panel discussion of the case by Teranishi and 
others, held at Waseda University in Tokyo on October 31, 1998. 
 3. These Acts consisted of a set of three interrelated acts, which contained provisions on 
confiscation of proceeds and other penalties, as well as on interception of communications. All three 
acts were submitted to the Diet in March 1998 and were enacted in August 1999. The two principal 
acts were: (1) Hanzai sōsa no tame no tsūshin bōju ni kansuru hōritsu [Act Concerning the Interception 
of Communications for the Purpose of Criminal Investigation], Law No. 137 of 1999; and (2) 
Soshikiteki na hanzai no shobatsu oyobi hanzai shūeki no kisei tō ni kansuru hōritsu [Act Concerning 
Punishment of Organized Crimes and Regulation of Criminal Proceeds, Etc.], Law No. 136 of 1999. 
The third act contained a few conforming amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure.  
 4. Until that time, Japanese law contained no express authorization for wiretaps, and 
controversy raged over whether wiretaps could ever be conducted lawfully. 
 5. In re Teranishi, 52 MINSHŪ at 1767. 
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After identifying himself as an assistant judge, Teranishi wrote, in part:  
[In the proposed bill,] interception of communications is to be 
conducted on the basis of a warrant issued in advance by a judge. 
Some people say this means there is no fear of wiretap abuse. 
However, as one who has had the opportunity to come in contact to 
a certain extent with the real circumstances of review of warrant 
applications by judges, I find it impossible to believe that review of 
warrant applications by judges will constitute a bulwark protecting 
human rights. The reality is that warrants are issued almost entirely 
in accordance with the wishes of prosecutors and police. Some 
people say this is the result of the fact that prosecutors and police 
are undertaking warrant requests in an appropriate manner. 
However, under existing law no warrant exists that authorizes 
investigations by wiretap, and the overwhelming consensus of 
criminal procedure scholars is that investigations by wiretap are 
illegal. Nonetheless, permits for inspection by telephone wiretap 
have been issued, and multiple district court and high court 
judgments have condoned the constitutionality and legality of such 
permits. In light of this fact, I cannot believe [that the reason 
warrants are issued in accordance with the wishes of prosecutors 
and police lies in the fact that their requests are always proper]. Do 
you really think it is safe to entrust the consideration of wiretapping 
warrants, which relate to the important human rights of 
confidentiality of communications, privacy, and freedom of 
expression, to this sort of judge?6  
This comment appeared under the title “Unreliable Review of Wiretap 
Warrants” in the Asahi Shinbun morning edition on October 2, 1997, in 
“Voices,” the readers’ comments section of the newspaper.7 
Teranishi reportedly had submitted comments in the past on other 
topics related to the judiciary, but this time there was a reply.8 On October 
8, the Asahi Shinbun ran a response, also in the “Voices” section, from 
Judge Tao Kenjirō, Deputy Chief Judge of the Tokyo District Court. Tao 
wrote, in part:  
As one judge who has spent night and day considering warrant 
requests, I cannot ignore [Teranishi’s] remarks. . . . Not only are the 
 
 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. TERANISHI, supra note 2, at 162–63. 
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remarks far different from the reality of practices regarding 
warrants, they are nothing other than a grave insult to judges and 
other court personnel who are undertaking their duties seriously.9  
In March 1998, the Cabinet submitted to the Diet the bills for the three 
Organized Crime Countermeasures Acts, including the bill for the Act 
Concerning Interception of Communications, which contained the 
provisions authorizing wiretaps pursuant to judicially issued warrants.10 
Opposition to that bill was strong, and the debate became politically 
charged. Three organizations opposed to the bill decided to voice their 
opposition through a convention, which would include a symposium on 
“The Wiretapping Law and the Warrant Principle.”11 Presumably in part 
because of his Asahi Shinbun comment, the organizers invited Teranishi to 
participate as a panelist in the symposium, and he accepted.  
The convention coordinating committee prepared a leaflet concerning 
the symposium and other events associated with the convention, which 
bore the title Crush the Wiretapping Act/Organized Crime 
Countermeasures Acts! Do Not Permit a Police State [keisatsu kanri 
shakai]! Convention April 18. These leaflets were distributed to the 
general public, and were also posted widely in the vicinity of the Kokkai-
gijidōmae Station of the Tokyo Metro (which adjoins the National Diet 
Building and is near the Supreme Court Building).12 How the leaflet came 
to the attention of the chief judge of the Sendai District Court is not clear, 
but on April 9, 1998, the chief judge showed Teranishi a copy of the 
leaflet and asked him to explain it. According to the Supreme Court’s 
ruling, Teranishi admitted that he knew the convention opposed the bill 
and sought its defeat, and that he shared that view and planned to 
participate in the panel discussion. He said that, in his judgment, this did 
not constitute “actively engaging in political movements” (sekkyokuteki ni 
seiji undō wo suru koto)—conduct prohibited for judges under article 
52(1) of the Courts Act;13 but he said that if the chief judge felt his 
participation in the panel discussion would violate that article, he wished 
to take some time to reconsider.14 
The symposium took place as scheduled on April 18, 1998, with about 
five hundred people in attendance. Pursuant to his request, Teranishi’s 
 
 
 9. Id. at 163–64.  
 10. In re Teranishi, 52 MINSHŪ at 1767–68. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at 1768–69. 
 13. Saibanshohō [Courts Act], Law No. 59 of 1947. 
 14. TERANISHI, supra note 2, at 179–82. 
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statement as a panelist was cancelled. Just before the panel discussion 
started, however, Teranishi spoke for a few minutes, from the general 
seating section of the hall.15 After making clear that he was an assistant 
judge at Sendai District Court, he made statements to the following effect,  
Initially, it was my intention to participate as a panelist in this 
symposium on the topic of the wiretap act and the warrant principle. 
However, prior to this convention, I was warned by the chief judge 
that if I participated it might lead to disciplinary action, so I decided 
to cancel my participation as a panelist. As for myself, even if I 
were to speak from the standpoint of opposition to the bill, I do not 
think that it would constitute actively engaging in political 
movements as specified in the Courts Act, but I decline to speak as 
a panelist.16  
Two weeks later, the Sendai District Court filed with the Sendai High 
Court a request for disciplinary action against Teranishi, on the ground 
that through his statement at the symposium, Teranishi had actively 
engaged in a political movement and thus had violated article 52(1) of the 
Courts Act. On July 24, 1998, the High Court issued a ruling on the 
request for discipline.17 It found that Teranishi “made a statement that 
manifested, by implication, his opposition to the bill, and thereby actively 
assisted a political movement aimed at defeat of the bill,” and issued a 
formal reprimand.18 Teranishi then appealed to the Supreme Court, where, 
as provided by the law governing cases of judicial discipline,19 the case 
was heard by the Grand Bench (all fifteen justices sitting en banc).20  
B. The United States: The Sanders Case 
Shortly before the above events took place in Japan, a similar situation 
occurred in the United States, in the State of Washington. That case 
involved Richard Sanders, who was elected justice of the Washington 
State Supreme Court in November 1995.21 His swearing-in ceremony took 
place at the Supreme Court building in Olympia, Washington, the state 
 
 
 15. In re Teranishi, 52 MINSHŪ at 1769–70. 
 16. Id. at 1770. 
 17. Id. at 1815–16 (Sendai High Ct., July 24, 1998). 
 18. Id. at 1810–20.  
 19. Saibankan bungen hō [Judge Status Act], Law No. 127 of 1947, § 4. 
 20. The Supreme Court of Japan is divided into three so-called petty benches, each consisting of 
five justices, and the vast majority of cases are decided by the petty benches. 
 21. The following summary of the facts is based on the Washington State Supreme Court 
decision, In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Sanders (Sanders), 955 P.2d 369 (Wash. 1998).  
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capitol, on January 26, 1996. On the same day, the anti-abortion 
organization Washington State March for Life (“March for Life”) held its 
annual rally in Olympia.22 The rally included a march, which took the 
group past the Supreme Court building to the steps of the Legislative 
Building, where various speakers addressed the crowd.23 
A few days earlier, Sanders had called a close friend, who was also the 
president of Human Life of Washington, another anti-abortion 
organization. Sanders told his friend that he would be attending the rally 
and that he would like to address the crowd.24 As the Washington State 
Supreme Court explained in its later decision on the matter, “Justice 
Sanders knew at the time he sought an opportunity to speak at the rally 
that there was a ‘political aspect’ to the abortion issue as well as a ‘moral 
aspect.’”25 When later asked whether he had taken any steps to determine 
whether the rally would be to support pro-life legislators and pro-life 
legislation, “Justice Sanders responded that he ‘didn’t do a great deal of 
research about this,’ but rather only read March for Life’s advertisement 
and spoke to [his friend].”26 The advertisement had urged members of the 
public to join the rally and to “join and witness all life is sacred.” It further 
urged participants to carry a red rose, “the pro-life symbol.”27 
Following his swearing-in ceremony, Justice Sanders walked to the 
nearby rally, carrying a red rose.28 Sanders said that he had worn the rose 
“because the sponsors had asked participants to carry one, in his 
estimation, ‘to identify themselves as a participant in the event.’”29 
When Justice Sanders arrived at the rally, the president of March for 
Life introduced him as a “Chief Justice.” Making light of the inaccurate 
introduction, he addressed the crowd: 
Well, I’m not quite Chief Justice, but I am a Justice. That’s plenty 
good enough for me. I want to give all of you my best wishes in this 
celebration of human life. Nothing is, nor should be, more 
fundamental in our legal system than the preservation and 
protection of innocent human life. By coincidence, or perhaps by 
providence, my formal induction to the Washington State Supreme 
 
 
 22. Id. at 370. 
 23. Id.  
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
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Court occurred about an hour ago. I owe my election to many of the 
people who are here today and I’m here to say thank you very much 
and good luck. Our mutual pursuit of justice requires a lifetime of 
dedication and courage. Keep up the good work.30 
Justice Sanders then immediately left the rally. 
The Washington Commission on Judicial Conduct (“CJC”), the body 
charged with investigating complaints against judges and other cases in 
which there is “reason to believe” a judge should be investigated for 
possible misconduct,31 investigated Sanders’ participation in the rally.32 
After a confidential preliminary investigation, “[t]he CJC determined that 
probable cause existed to believe that Justice Sanders violated” five 
provisions of the Washington State Code of Judicial Conduct, including 
Canon 7(A),33 relating to “Political Conduct in General,” which states, in 
part, that judges “shall not . . . make speeches for a political organization” 
nor shall they “attend political functions sponsored by political 
organizations,”34 and Canon 7(A)(5), which provides that “Judges should 
not engage in any other political activity except on behalf of measures to 
improve the law, the legal system or the administration of justice.”35 After 
a fact-finding hearing open to the public, the CJC found that Justice 
Sanders violated three canons, including Canon 7(A)(5), and “ordered that 
Sanders be reprimanded and required to complete a course in judicial 
ethics.”36 Justice Sanders appealed to the Washington State Supreme 
Court.37  
 
 
 30. Id. at 371. 
 31. WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 31. 
 32. Sanders, 955 P.2d at 371. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 372. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 371. 
 37. The composition of the “supreme court” that considered Sanders’ appeal is worthy of note. 
As one would expect, Sanders himself did not participate in the decision. None of the other sitting 
justices of the supreme court participated either. Out of concern over the tensions that might arise if the 
other eight justices had to decide on disciplinary matters relating to a colleague on the same court, a 
rule provides that, if a justice of the supreme court is the subject of a disciplinary proceeding, a 
substitute panel is constituted to hear the case. For that purpose, nine judges, selected from among the 
judges of the Washington State Court of Appeals (the chief judge of that court, plus eight other judges 
chosen by lot), are designated as supreme court justices pro tempore. Accordingly, in this anomalous 
case, the state “supreme court” in fact was composed entirely of judges from the court of appeals. 
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II. THE OUTCOMES: THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS AND REASONING  
Although the relevant standards in Washington are considerably more 
detailed than those in Japan, the main standards at issue in these two cases 
were similar: the prohibition on “actively engaging in political 
movements” contained in Article 52(1) of the Courts Act in Japan, and the 
prohibition on engaging in “political activity,” unless of a type subject to a 
specific exception, contained in the Code of Judicial Conduct in 
Washington. The decisions of the Supreme Court of Japan and the 
Washington State Supreme Court bear many similarities. Both courts 
found, for example, that judges enjoy the constitutional right to freedom of 
expression. Both courts also found, however, that this right must be 
balanced against the public interest in a fair and impartial judiciary.  
Despite the similarities in their decisions, the courts weighed the 
balance rather differently. The Washington State Supreme Court placed 
great weight on judges’ right to free expression. It reiterated the 
importance of that right at several points in its opinion and held that the 
constitutionality of a restriction on that right must be subjected to a strict 
scrutiny test.38 Accordingly, the court concluded, in order to overcome that 
right, “the state must establish a compelling interest and demonstrate that 
any restriction is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.”39  
In contrast, the Supreme Court of Japan placed great weight on the 
interest in a fair and impartial judiciary. While noting that “judges 
naturally enjoy freedom of expression as individual citizens,” the court 
emphasized that “this freedom is not absolute; it is subject to restriction 
based on other constitutional demands.”40 While giving only limited 
mention to the values served by freedom of expression, at several points 
throughout the opinion the court recited in considerable detail the values 
promoted by restrictions on judges’ statements. The court, for example, 
expressed concern that politically-oriented conduct by judges “may erode 
the foundation on which the judiciary rests and may undermine the 
people’s trust in the impartiality and fairness of judges, and may also lead 
to improper interference and intrusion on the legislative and administrative 
powers.”41 The court later reiterated these concerns by stating, “the 
purposes of the prohibition are to protect the independence and the 
impartiality and fairness of judges, to maintain the trust of the people in 
 
 
 38. Sanders, 955 P.2d at 376. 
 39. Id. at 375. 
 40. In re Teranishi, 52 MINSHŪ 1761, 1776 (Sup. Ct., Dec. 1, 1998). 
 41. Id. at 1774. 
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the courts, and to regulate the relationships among the judicial, legislative, 
and administrative branches in the separation of powers.”42 Notably, the 
Japanese Supreme Court did not subject the restriction on freedom of 
expression to strict scrutiny. Although the opinion announced the 
governing standard to be whether “the restriction is reasonable and limited 
to the least restrictive degree necessary,”43 the court had no trouble 
finding that the restriction was reasonable and did not even attempt to 
undertake an examination of whether other, less restrictive alternatives 
might have been available.44  
Thus, the Washington State Supreme Court tipped the balance in the 
direction of judges’ right to free expression, whereas the Japanese 
Supreme Court tipped the balance toward maintaining the image of a fair 
and impartial judiciary.  
In a number of respects, Sanders’ conduct seems more problematic 
than Teranishi’s. If anything, the issue involved—abortion—is even more 
politically charged than wiretapping. Whereas Teranishi was invited to 
participate, Sanders initiated his participation himself, by calling the 
rally’s organizer and asking for the opportunity to address the gathering. 
Sanders indicated his support for the rally’s agenda not only by attending, 
but also by carrying a red rose symbolizing his solidarity with the cause. 
His remarks, including such phrases as, “[n]othing is, nor should be, more 
fundamental in our legal system,” and “[o]ur mutual pursuit of justice,”45 
could be seen as implying a commitment to use his judicial position to 
further the cause. The circumstances of his participation, on the steps of 
the state legislature, immediately after his swearing-in ceremony at the 
nearby supreme court, strengthen the impact of his actions. Sanders was, 
after all, a supreme court justice, whereas Teranishi was still an assistant 
judge. Notwithstanding all of these circumstances, the Washington State 
Supreme Court overturned Sanders’ censure, while the Japanese Supreme 
Court upheld Teranishi’s. Consequently, the single largest contrast 
between the two cases lies in their ultimate outcomes. 
That said, these were not easy cases in either Japan or the United 
States. In Japan, five of the fifteen justices dissented, with five different 
dissenting opinions (four of which were joined by two of more justices) 
setting forth various grounds for disagreement with the majority. In 
 
 
 42. Id. at 1777. 
 43. Id. (emphasis added). 
 44. Id. 
 45. In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Sanders (Sanders), 955 P.2d 369, 371 (Wash. 1998). 
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particular, the dissent by Justice Endō Mitsuo,46 which argued that, given 
the vital importance of the freedom of expression, any restriction should 
be construed in as narrow a manner as possible,47 bore deep similarities to 
the reasoning of the Washington State Supreme Court. Moreover, as the 
Japanese Supreme Court noted, while there are differences in degree, 
every nation imposes some limits on the political activities of judges.48  
The Washington State Supreme Court opinion was unanimous. That 
fact should not, however, suggest that it was a simple decision. The 
difficulty of the Sanders case is reflected by the fact that the CJC found 
that Sanders had violated three separate canons of the Code of Judicial 
Conduct and, in addition to imposing a reprimand, ordered him to 
complete a course in judicial ethics.49 Notably, the CJC’s reasoning, which 
rested largely on the conclusion that Sanders’s participation in the rally 
“diminish[ed] public confidence in the judiciary,”50 bore similarities to 
that of the Japanese Supreme Court in the Teranishi case. Furthermore, as 
the Washington State Supreme Court noted in its opinion, courts in prior 
cases both within Washington and elsewhere in the United States have 
grappled with the question of where to draw the line between freedom of 
expression and restrictions on judges’ political activity.51 American legal 
scholars continue to debate that point, with some arguing for greater limits 
on judges’ speech than the Washington State Supreme Court recognized.52 
Incidentally, as one of the grounds for challenging his reprimand, 
Teranishi pointed to the standards applicable in foreign nations, arguing 
that other nations are more tolerant of judicial speech.53 In rejecting this 
argument, the majority observed that other nations have “different 
historical backgrounds and societal conditions from Japan.”54  
In this context, one important systemic difference between Japan and 
Washington State bears note: the judicial selection process. Japanese 
judges are appointed. In the case of lower court judges, the Cabinet holds 
the authority to appoint judges from a list of candidates prepared by the 
Supreme Court’s General Secretariat. In theory, placing the ultimate 
 
 
 46. In re Teranishi, 52 MINSHŪ at 1799–1806. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 1778. 
 49. Sanders, 955 P.2d at 371. 
 50. Id. at 372. 
 51. Id. at 373–75. 
 52. Compare, e.g., Steven Lubet, Judicial Conduct: Speech and Consequences, 4 LONG TERM 
VIEW 71 (1997), with Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Speech: Judges and the First Amendment, 4 
LONG TERM VIEW 78 (1997). 
 53. In re Teranishi, 52 MINSHŪ at 1778. 
 54. Id.  
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appointment authority in the Cabinet could lead to a highly politicized 
process, in which the Cabinet carefully screens candidates on that list and 
rejects those deemed unsuitable, for ideological or other reasons. In 
practice, however, that has not been the case; the Cabinet routinely follows 
the Supreme Court’s recommendations.55 Even for appointments to the 
Supreme Court (for which the Cabinet is also responsible), the 
appointment process in Japan follows clearly established patterns and is 
not highly politicized.56  
The judicial selection process is very different in Washington. There, at 
both the lower court and State Supreme Court levels, judges are elected by 
popular vote and must stand for reelection. (For supreme court justices and 
court of appeals judges, the term of office is six years; for superior court 
judges, the term of office is four years.) The elections are conducted on a 
“non-partisan” basis; in other words, judges do not identify their political 
affiliation and do not run for election as members of any given political 
party. Nonetheless, judicial candidates’ political views constitute a 
relevant factor for the elections. In the Sanders case, the Washington State 
Supreme Court explicitly recognized this systemic aspect in setting forth 
the relevant factors to be considered in the balancing test. In addition to 
“the government’s interest in a fair and impartial judiciary” and “a judge’s 
interest in the right to express his or her views,” which were, in essence, 
the two relevant interests balanced by the Japanese Supreme Court, the 
Washington court identified a third important interest: “the need for the 
free expression of those views in a system wherein members of the 
judiciary are elected to office by the vote of the people.”57  
III. PROCEDURAL STANDARDS AND PUBLIC SCRUTINY: JAPAN’S 
NAMELESS, FACELESS JUDICIARY 
In these cases and in the standards governing political activity by 
judges and the disciplinary process, one finds signs of a difference in 
philosophy regarding the very conception of the judiciary and of judges’ 
roles. In the United States, judges have public personae; many judges are 
known to the public by name (and some are known by face), and their 
 
 
 55. See, e.g., John O. Haley, The Japanese Judiciary: Maintaining Integrity, Autonomy, and the 
Public Trust, in LAW IN JAPAN: A TURNING POINT 99, 103–04 (Daniel H. Foote ed., 2007). For an 
examination of recent reforms to the judicial appointment process in Japan, see Daniel H. Foote, 
Recent Reforms to the Japanese Judiciary: Real Change or Mere Appearance?, 66 HŌSHAKAIGAKU 
128 (2007). 
 56. See, e.g., Haley, supra note 55, at 105–09. 
 57. In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Sanders (Sanders), 955 P.2d 369, 374 (Wash. 1998). 
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personalities and views matter. On occasion, the public recognition 
backfires; some judges engage in conduct or make statements that bring 
the judiciary into disrepute. Yet, on the whole, public knowledge of who 
judges are and, to a certain extent, what they think, is viewed in the United 
States as helping to maintain public trust in the judiciary.  
In contrast, for Japan’s nameless, faceless judiciary, public recognition 
is not desired. People’s trust in the impartiality and fairness of judges is 
viewed as resting in large part on the image of uniformity, and on the 
corresponding view that the identity of the judge does not matter. 
Procedures and outcomes are expected to be the same regardless of who 
the judge is; publicity about individual judges, or the workings of the 
judicial system, could undermine the image of uniformity and impair trust.  
This image of uniformity is reflected in numerous aspects of the 
Japanese judicial system. For an American observer, one of the most 
striking reflections of this attitude lies in the fact that it is not unusual for 
judges to change midway through a trial. Judges are typically transferred 
every three years. With most trials held on a non-continuous basis, often 
with a month or more between hearing sessions, some trials take years to 
complete.58 The combination of these two features means judges 
sometimes shift during the trial. Presumably because the identity of the 
judges is not supposed to matter, this change in judges is an accepted 
feature of the Japanese judicial system. Similarly, while the names of the 
judges involved in judgments are listed, below the Supreme Court level, 
even in the case of three-judge panels, opinions are unsigned and there are 
no dissents or concurring opinions.59 The basic stance is that the judgment 
reflects the collective view of the court, and it is irrelevant which judge 
drafted the opinion. In keeping with this stance, efforts are made to 
achieve uniformity in opinion formats and writing style. Even courtroom 
design is highly standardized. Another very important aspect of the 
emphasis on uniformity is the fact that great weight is accorded to 
obedience to precedent. (In the words of former Supreme Court Justice, 
and Anglo-American law scholar, Itō Masami, “Legal stability is accorded 
the greatest weight [in Japan]. The feeling is strong that, if precedents are 
changed, it will impair legal stability and undermine trust in the law 
 
 
 58. As a formal matter, consent of the parties is required for a change in judges (formally, a 
“renovation” of proceedings). See, e.g., Keiji soshō kisoku [Rules of Criminal Procedure], Supreme 
Court Rules No. 32 of 1948, art. 213-2. The parties routinely consent, however. 
 59. At the Supreme Court level, concurrences (or, technically, supplementary opinions) and 
dissents are reported and signed. Even at the Supreme Court level, however, judgments (which are the 
equivalent of majority opinions) are unsigned, leaving it unclear which justice bore primary 
responsibility for drafting the judgment. 
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itself.”60 “[B]arring exceptional circumstances, lower courts follow 
Supreme Court precedent even if they are dissatisfied with the 
precedent.”61) Given the ethos that the identity of the judge is irrelevant, 
Japanese judges operate largely in anonymity, and the workings of the 
judicial system are largely hidden from public view.  
Against the backdrop of these differences in institutional structure and 
conception of the judiciary, the differing stances of the Japanese Supreme 
Court in the Teranishi case and the Washington State Supreme Court in 
the Sanders case should come as little surprise. The difference in 
philosophy ties to what may be an even more striking contrast between the 
Teranishi and Sanders cases than the outcomes themselves: a broad set of 
procedural differences between the two cases, and, in particular, the 
relative openness of the proceedings.  
In Japan, Teranishi fought to have the disciplinary proceedings against 
him open to the public, based on article 82 of the Constitution, which 
provides: “Trials shall be conducted and judgment declared publicly.”62 
After a preliminary hearing focused primarily on that issue, the Sendai 
High Court rejected Teranishi’s request on the ground that “discipline of 
judges . . . constitutes an internal procedural matter,”63 rather than a “trial” 
subject to article 82. Despite this ruling, on the date of the hearing on the 
merits, Teranishi showed up together with a defense team of about fifty 
members.64  
In its later ruling on the merits of the disciplinary matter, the Sendai 
High Court implied that Teranishi had abused the system in an effort to 
bring greater public scrutiny to the case. “[Teranishi] should have had 
sufficient knowledge and ability to handle [the case] himself,” stated the 
High Court. “That notwithstanding, he . . . appointed a huge number of 
representatives, even including someone who is not an attorney . . . but is 
said to be an exposé writer, and thereby engaged in activity that in effect 
rendered meaningless the determination that this was to be a closed 
hearing.”65 On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the High Court’s 
decision to keep the hearing closed. The word “trial” in article 82, the 
Supreme Court ruled, “should be interpreted as referring only to trials in 
 
 
 60. ITŌ MASAMI, SAIBANKAN TO GAKUSHA NO AIDA [BETWEEN JUSTICE AND SCHOLAR] 49 
(1993). 
 61. Id. at 45. 
 62. KENPŌ [CONST.], art. 82, para. 1. 
 63. See In re Teranishi, 52 MINSHŪ 1810, 1816 (Sendai High Ct., July 24, 1998). 
 64. As it previously indicated it would, the Sendai High Court limited the number permitted to 
attend the hearing to thirty-five. Id. at 1817–18. 
 65. Id. at 1819. 
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true litigation cases”; the Teranishi case, on the other hand, “in substance 
constituted an administrative disposition,” not subject to article 82.66 
Notably, these rulings rested primarily on a legal formality, the distinction 
between the concepts of a “trial” and an “administrative disposition,” and 
did not address the underlying question of the extent of the public’s right 
to know regarding judicial disciplinary matters.  
In sum, in Japan, the disciplinary proceedings against Teranishi (as 
with disciplinary proceedings against other judges) were conducted 
entirely by the judiciary as an internal matter: the Sendai District Court 
initiated the proceedings, the Sendai High Court conducted the hearings 
and issued the decision on the merits, and the Supreme Court considered 
the appeal. Moreover, virtually all of the proceedings were carried on 
behind closed doors, shielded from direct public scrutiny. 
The process in Washington State lies in sharp contrast to that in Japan. 
As noted earlier, in Washington, cases involving possible misconduct by 
judges are investigated by the CJC. That commission was established 
pursuant to a provision of the Washington State Constitution, passed by 
voters in 1980.67 According to that provision, the CJC is “an independent 
agency of the judicial branch,”68 consisting of eleven members. As 
specified in the Constitution, only three of those eleven members are 
judges (one each from the court of appeals, the superior court, and the 
district court level, selected by judges at each of those levels); the other 
eight members consist of two attorneys selected by the state bar 
association, and six non-attorney citizens appointed by the Governor.69 In 
short, the relevant review body, while in form an “agency of the judicial 
branch,” in fact is a highly independent body, with a majority of the 
members coming not only from outside the judiciary, but also from 
outside the legal profession.  
The Washington State Constitution also sets forth the procedural steps 
to be taken by the CJC. Here again, central themes are transparency and 
accountability to the public. When the CJC receives a complaint or 
otherwise has reason to believe an investigation is warranted, it first 
conducts a preliminary investigation, which is confidential.70 If, based on 
the initial investigation, the CJC finds probable cause to believe a judge 
has violated a rule of judicial conduct, the Commission “shall conduct a 
 
 
 66. In re Teranishi, 52 MINSHŪ 1761, 1783–84 (Sup. Ct., Dec. 1, 1998). 
 67. WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 31. 
 68. Id. § 31(1). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. § 31(2). 
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public hearing or hearings and shall make public all those records of the 
initial proceeding that provide the basis for its conclusion.”71 “Upon the 
completion of the hearing or hearings, the Commission in open session 
shall either dismiss the case, or shall admonish, reprimand, or censure the 
judge . . . .”72 If the CJC takes disciplinary action, the judge is entitled to 
appeal that determination to the Washington State Supreme Court, where 
the hearing on the appeal again is open to the public.73 In sum, once 
probable cause is found, the records supporting the finding of probable 
cause are to be made public, and all hearings thereafter are open to the 
public.  
As these contrasting procedures reflect, the Japanese judiciary’s 
philosophy is one of internal discipline and confidentiality, whereas that of 
Washington State is one of openness. This philosophical difference 
extends more broadly. The Washington State Constitution provides, 
“Justice in all cases shall be administered openly.”74 In a unanimous 2004 
decision ordering records in a civil case to be opened to the public, the 
Washington State Supreme Court reaffirmed that principle in strong terms, 
stating: “The open operation of our courts is of utmost public importance. 
Justice must be conducted openly to foster the public’s understanding and 
trust in our judicial system and to give judges the check of public scrutiny. 
Secrecy fosters mistrust.”75 In contrast, while the guarantee of open trials 
contained in article 82 of the Japanese Constitution would seem to imply 
that trial records would also be open to the public, traditionally access to 
trial records in Japan has been sharply limited. Until a few years ago, there 
appeared to be a gradual relaxation of the restrictions on access to trial 
records. Yet recent emphasis on protection of “personal information” 
(kojin jōhō)76 has to a great extent reversed that trend. Whereas the 
Washington State Supreme Court welcomes public scrutiny on the view 
that it fosters public trust, the Japanese judiciary, to a great extent, still 
seems to fear public scrutiny.  
One other difference in the disciplinary process is relevant to this 
analysis. In Japan, the debate in the Teranishi case focused almost entirely 
on the interpretation of a single phrase: “actively engaging in political 
 
 
 71. Id. § 31(3) (emphasis added). 
 72. Id. § 31(4) (emphasis added). 
 73. Id. § 31(6). 
 74. Id. art. I, § 10. 
 75. Dreiling v. Jain, 93 P.3d 861, 864 (Wash. 2004). 
 76. See, e.g., Kojin jōhō no hogo ni kansuru hōritsu [Act Concerning the Protection of Personal 
Information], Law No. 57 of 2003.  
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movements,” contained in article 52(1) of the Courts Act.77 In 
Washington, on the other hand, the debate in the Sanders case extended to 
five Canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct. According to its Preamble, 
that Code “is intended to establish standards for ethical conduct of 
judges.”78 It consists of seven broad Canons, over forty specific rules 
(sections and sub-sections set forth under each Canon), and numerous 
Comments that explain the purpose and meaning of the Canons and rules. 
In sum, the relevant ethical standards are much more developed and 
detailed in Washington than those in Japan.  
In this respect (as is the case with respect to the limited public 
participation in the disciplinary process), the situation for the judiciary 
resembles that for the other two branches of the legal profession. Until 
recently, in Japan, discipline for attorneys, for judges, and for prosecutors 
has been left almost entirely to the bar associations, the judiciary, and the 
Ministry of Justice, respectively, and the relevant ethical standards have 
not been deeply developed. For various reasons (including the designation 
of “professional responsibility” as one of the required courses in new, 
graduate-level law schools, which began operations in 2004), the past few 
years have seen much greater attention to ethical standards for lawyers in 
Japan, but little public attention has yet been paid to ethical standards for 
judges and prosecutors. Moreover, even today, with respect to all three 
branches of the legal profession, discipline continues to be treated as a 
matter to be decided by that branch of the profession, and outside scrutiny 
remains very limited. 
One specific aspect of the Washington State Code of Judicial Conduct 
is particularly relevant in this regard. In addition to negative provisions—
i.e., provisions setting forth limits on activities by judges—the Code also 
includes positive provisions, setting forth types of activity that are 
permitted, and in some cases even encouraged. Thus, for example, Canon 
4 announces the broad principle: “Judges may engage in activities to 
improve the law, the legal system and the administration of justice.”79 A 
more specific rule under Canon 4 announces that “if in doing so they do 
not cast doubt on their capacity to decide impartially any issue that may 
come before them,” judges “may speak, write, lecture, teach, and 
participate in other activities concerning the law, the legal system, and the 
administration of justice.”80 A Comment to Canon 4 adds:  
 
 
 77. Saibanshohō [Courts Act], Law No. 52(1) of 1947. 
 78. WASHINGTON STATE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, pmbl. (1995). 
 79. WASHINGTON STATE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 4 (1995). 
 80. Id. 
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As judicial officers and persons specially learned in the law, judges 
are in a unique position to contribute to the improvement of the law, 
the legal system and the administration of justice, including revision 
of substantive and procedural law and improvement of criminal and 
juvenile justice. To the extent that their time permits, they are 
encouraged to do so, either independently or through a bar 
association, judicial conference, or other organization dedicated to 
the improvement of the law.81 
With this Canon in mind, let us reexamine the facts of the Teranishi 
case. If, as Teranishi asserted in his Asahi Shinbun comment, it really is 
true that judges routinely rubberstamp warrant requests, that fact would be 
very important to the debate over the extent to which the warrant 
provisions of the Interception of Communications Act afford meaningful 
protections against abuse of wiretaps. And, apart from retired judges and 
court clerks, no one outside the judiciary would be in a position to know 
that reality. Thus, while the venue for Teranishi’s initially scheduled panel 
discussion—a rally opposed to a proposed bill—conceivably might raise 
concern over whether he had “cast doubt on [his] capacity to decide 
impartially any issue that may come before [him],” the content of his 
remarks as a panelist almost certainly would have focused on matters 
relating to “improv[ing] the law, the legal system and the administration of 
justice.”82 As such, in Washington, such remarks would seem to fall within 
the scope of activities protected, and even positively encouraged, by 
Canon 4.83  
In closing, one final similarity between the Teranishi and Sanders 
cases bears mention: both judges are still on the bench. Justice Sanders has 
been reelected twice; once in 1998, and again in 2004. Teranishi, at the 
 
 
 81. Id. cmt. (emphasis added). 
 82. In re Teranishi, 52 MINSHŪ 1761, 1779 (Sup. Ct., Dec. 1, 1998). 
 83. In this connection, the Japanese Supreme Court in the Teranishi case distinguished 
Teranishi’s activities from various other legislation-related activities in which Japanese judges 
frequently participate, such as “the preparation of legislation as a member of an advisory council or in 
some other such capacity . . . at the request of the legislative branch or the administrative branch,” or 
“announcing opposition to a particular legislative move in an article, lecture, or the like, making clear 
one’s status as a judge, . . . as one’s personal opinion.” In contrast, said the Court, “when . . . one 
engages in conduct in active support of a partisan movement by organizations aimed at the defeat of a 
particular bill, that conduct is different in nature [from the foregoing sorts of permissible activities].” 
Id. at 1779.  
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conclusion of his ten-year term as an assistant judge, was appointed as a 
judge in 2003.84 Both have continued to write and speak.85 
 
 
 84. See NIHON MINSHU HŌRITSUKA KYŌKAI SHIHŌ SEIDO IINKAI [JAPAN DEMOCRATIC JURISTS 
ASS’N, JUSTICE SYS. COMM.], ZENSAIBANKAN KEIREKI SŌRAN [JUDGES ALMANAC] 261 (4th ed. 2004) 
(reference table of transfers).  
 85. In addition to the autobiographical YUKAI NA SAIBANKAN [A CHEERFUL JUDGE], supra note 
2, Teranishi co-authored a book with the provocative title: SAIBANKAN WO SHINJIRU NA! [DON’T 
TRUST JUDGES!] (2001) (co-authored with Yanagihara Mika and Matsunaga Kensei). Justice Sanders 
maintains his own home page, http://www.justicesanders.com/, which contains a list of his writings 
and speeches. In a reflection of the greater visibility of judges in the United States, it bears note that 
Sanders is by no means the only American judge with his or her own webpage. As another striking 
example, Judge Richard A. Posner, well-known judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit, maintains, together with economist and Nobel laureate Gary S. Becker, an active blog that 
contains comments on many aspects of law, politics, and the economy, http://www.becker-posner-
blog.com/.  
 As a final note, Sanders’s actions off the bench have continued to attract attention. In 2005 the 
CJC again found that Sanders had violated the canons of judicial ethics, this time for visiting a state 
facility for sexually violent predators and engaging in conversation with inmates at that facility, some 
of whom were litigants or potential litigants in matters before the Washington Supreme Court. This 
time, the Washington Supreme Court (again composed entirely of judges from the Court of Appeals, 
serving in place of the regular justices) upheld the finding and penalty—an “admonishment,” the 
lowest level of punishment under the Washington state system. See In re Disciplinary Proceeding 
Against Sanders, 145 P.3d 1208 (Wash. 2006). Sanders made headlines again recently. In November 
2008, when then-U.S. Attorney General Michael Mukasey defended the Bush administration’s anti-
terrorism policies in a speech at a Federalist Society dinner in Washington, D.C., Sanders stood and 
shouted, “Tyrant! You are a tyrant!” See, e.g., Ken Armstrong, State Justice Confirms He Yelled 
“Tyrant!” at Mukasey Before AG Collapsed, SEATTLE TIMES ONLINE, Nov. 25, 2008, http://seattle 
times.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2008435605_websanders25m.html. In February 2009, Sanders 
explained his views on the Bush administration’s attitude toward the rule of law in a guest column in 
the Seattle Times. Richard B. Sanders, Attorney General Holder: Hold Bush Administration 
Accountable, SEATTLE TIMES ONLINE, Feb. 2, 2009, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/opinion/ 
2008699563_opinb03sanders.html. 
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